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I.  INTRODUCTION
The problem of rapidly escalating premiums paid by doctors for medical
malpractice insurance has plagued Pennsylvania in the last decade.1  These
rates have uprooted Pennsylvania doctors from their local practices and
hospitals in favor of out-of-state locations with lower rates.2  Furthermore,
some Pennsylvania doctors and hospitals specializing in high-risk procedures
have refused to perform high-risk surgeries or have limited their practice to
more routine procedures.3
In an effort to improve the medical malpractice landscape, the
Pennsylvania legislature, recognizing that maintaining high quality health care
requires “medical professional liability insurance . . . to be obtainable at an
affordable and reasonable cost,”4 enacted a series of reforms in its massive
Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act (“MCARE”) of 2002.
The language of MCARE reveals the legislature’s intention that it provide for
a prompt determination of litigation and fair compensation for injuries
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5. See id.
6. See generally id. §§ 1303.301-1303.314.
7. Id.
8. See id. § 1303.505.
9. See id. § 1303.512.
10. See id.
resulting from medical negligence5 by overhauling the manner in which the
law and medical professionals and patients interact.  As its name indicates,
one major thrust of MCARE addresses and sets forth procedures to reduce one
reputed source of the medical malpractice crisis:  physician error.  MCARE
attempts to achieve this objective through mandatory reporting procedures and
record-keeping that require enhanced scrutiny of patient safety.6  In addition
to emphasizing tools to police physician error and increase patient safety,
MCARE reforms various legal aspects of medical malpractice litigation.  Such
changes include codifying a statute of repose7 and establishing new
procedures regarding awarding damages, particularly punitive damages.8  One
seemingly innocuous change now spawning considerable litigation in
Pennsylvania trial courts establishes a standard setting forth the minimum
qualifications necessary for medical experts testifying to a standard of care in
a medical malpractice action.9  This new standard is codified in Section 512.10
Section 512 displaces, at least in some instances, the discretionary
common law standard that governed the admissibility of expert testimony.
Although Section 512 sets forth new qualifications a testifying physician must
satisfy, the precise impact of this standard remains uncertain as judicial
analysis of Section 512 and its statutory language is in its infancy.  This note
focuses upon the relatively undeveloped case law regarding the statutory
language of Section 512.  This note intends to introduce and resolve,
consistent with Pennsylvania law, the significant current and future statutory
issues associated with Section 512.  Specifically, Part II of this comment will
examine the background of Section 512, including the statutory language, its
policy and the legislative history, to conclude that basic rules of statutory
construction establish a legislative intent to enact a stricter standard with
heightened qualifications for medical experts.  Part III will address the proper
resolution, consistent with legislative intent, of currently litigated issues,
including the timing of the qualification requirement and its applicability to
physician defendants.  Part IV will forecast future issues involving unresolved
statutory terms to suggest that a relatively narrow interpretation of these terms
is required to preserve their plain meaning and effectuate the intent of the
legislature.  Part V will examine the role of the trial court’s discretionary
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bypass of the statutory requirements to conclude that the trial court must limit
its discretion to circumstances where Section 512 operates to preclude experts
unjustly or unfairly.  Part VI will conclude that Section 512 achieves the intent
of the legislature.
II.  BACKGROUND OF SECTION 512
A.  Statutory Language of Section 512
Integral to a proper statutory analysis is the language of the statute in
question.  Section 512, entitled “Expert Qualifications,” follows in full below:
(a) GENERAL RULE.—No person shall be competent to offer an expert medical
opinion in a medical professional liability action against a physician unless that
person possesses sufficient education, training, knowledge and experience to
provide credible, competent testimony and fulfills the additional qualifications set
forth in this section as applicable.
(b) MEDICAL TESTIMONY.—An expert testifying on a medical matter, including
the standard of care, risks and alternatives, causation and the nature and extent of
the injury, must meet the following qualifications:
(1) Possess an unrestricted physician’s license to practice medicine in any
state or the District of Columbia.
(2) Be engaged in or retired within the previous five years from active
clinical practice or teaching.
Provided, however, the court may waive the requirements of this subsection for an expert
on a matter other than the standard of care if the court determines that the expert is
otherwise competent to testify about medical or scientific issues by virtue of education,
training or experience.
(c) STANDARD OF CARE.—In addition to the requirements set forth in subsections
(a) and (b), an expert testifying as to a physician’s standard of care also must meet
the following qualifications:
(1) Be substantially familiar with the applicable standard of care for the
specific care at issue as of the time of the alleged breach of the standard
of care.
(2) Practice in the same subspecialty as the defendant physician or in a
subspecialty which has a substantially similar standard of care for the
specific care at issue, except as provided in subsection (d) or (e).
(3) In the event the defendant physician is certified by an approved board,
be board certified by the same or a similar approved board, except as
provided in subsection (e).
(d) CARE OUTSIDE SPECIALTY.—A court may waive the same subspecialty
requirement for an expert testifying on the standard of care for the diagnosis or
treatment of a condition if the court determines that:
(1) the expert is trained in the diagnosis or treatment of the condition, as
applicable; and
(2) the defendant physician provided care for that condition and such care
was not within the physician’s specialty or competence.
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12. Id. § 1303.512(a)-(b).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1303.512(c).
15. See id. § 1303.512(a)-(c).
16. See id. § 1303.512(d)-(e).
17. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1901-1939 (West 1995).
18. Id. § 1921(a).
19. Id.; see also McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-S-675, slip op. at 12 (Adams County Ct.
Com. Pl. Sept. 5, 2003) (statutes are to be construed so to give meaning to every word contained within the
statute).
20. Section 1921(b).
(e) OTHERWISE ADEQUATE TRAINING, EXPERIENCE AND
KNOWLEDGE.—A court may waive the same specialty and board certification
requirements for an expert testifying as to a standard of care if the court
determines that the expert possesses sufficient training, experience and knowledge
to provide the testimony as a result of active involvement in or full-time teaching
of medicine in the applicable subspecialty or a related field of medicine within the
previous five-year time period.11
Section 512 is structured as two interrelated standards.  Initially,
subsections (a) and (b) establish a standard requiring all medical experts to
satisfy minimal qualification criteria, regardless of the nature of the medical
expert’s testimony.12  Following these general requirements, the legislature set
forth a waiver provision affording a trial judge a discretionary bypass of the
statutory qualification requirements.13  Subsection (c) establishes a standard
that is relevant exclusively when a medical expert is testifying to a physician’s
standard of care.14  Accordingly, an expert addressing the standard of care in
a medical malpractice action must satisfy the requirements of subsections (a),
(b) and (c).15  The discretionary waiver of the subsection (c) requirements is
set forth in subsections (d) and (e).16
B.  Rules of Statutory Construction
The Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act establishes a hierarchy of
the canons of statutory construction.17  The foremost objective of statutory
construction and interpretation is determining and effectuating legislative
intent.18  The Act further instructs that every statute be construed to give effect
to all of the statutory provisions.19  When the language of the statute is free
from ambiguity, the Act provides that the plain meaning of the statute prevails
over any attempt to discern and pursue the spirit of the law.20  In the event the
words of the statute are not explicit, the legislative intent may be gleaned from
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21. Id. § 1921(c)(1)-(c)(8).
22. Id. § 1925.
23. Id. § 1922(a).
24. McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 12.
25. Section 1903(a).
26. See 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.102 (West Supp. 2005).
27. See id.
28. See Asher Hawkins, Pa. Judges to Analyze Med Mal Litigation Changes, 231 THE LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, No. 56, at 3 (quoting Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Ralph J. Cappy that “a
recognized crisis in the medical malpractice area” exists); McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 9.
29. McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 9-10.
factors including the objective of the statute, the consequences of a particular
interpretation, and the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the
statute.21  In addition, the preamble and title of the statute may be considered
in its construction.22
The Act codifies appropriate presumptions when ascertaining legislative
intent, including that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable
result.23  Case law further instructs that a modification in the language of a
proposed law by the legislature is indicative of a change in the legislature’s
admitted intent.24  The Act also sets forth rules to aid in the interpretation of
statutory provisions.  Rules relevant to this analysis include that words are to
be construed according to their “common and approved usage,” and “technical
words and phrases . . . [that] have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning
or are defined in this part, shall be construed according to such . . .
meaning.”25
C.  Policy Intent of Statute
The declaration of policy that prefaces MCARE illustrates the
legislature’s concern to forge a working balance within the healthcare system
between fair compensation for parties suffering injury from medical
negligence and the availability of high quality medical care.26  The legislature
further recognized that maintaining quality medical care required the
availability of affordable malpractice insurance for medical professionals.27
At the time of MCARE’s passage, skyrocketing insurance premiums had
spawned a widely recognized health care crisis within Pennsylvania.28
MCARE was one response by the legislature to ameliorate that crisis.29
Recognizing the legislature’s concern with the current state of health care
litigation, both trial courts and the Pennsylvania Superior Court have
concluded that Section 512 represents a more restrictive standard than the
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30. See Wexler v. Hecht, 847 A.2d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (recognizing that § 512 imposes
new requirements); McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 10; see also Spotts v. Small, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th 225,
235 (Lancaster County Ct. Com. Pl. 2003).
31. Gartland v. Rosenthal, 850 A.2d 671, 675 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Weiner v. Fisher, 67 Pa. D. &
C.4th 1, 10 (Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl. 2004).
32. H.B. 1802, Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. (Pa. 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/
LI/BI/BT/2001/0/HB1802P2317.htm.
33. Id.
34. H.B. 1802, Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. § 828-A, at 105 (Pa. 2001) (as amended Jan. 29, 2002),
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/BI/BT/2001/0/HB1802P3202.htm.
35. See id. at 105-06; McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 10-11.
36. H.B. 1802 § 828-A, at 105 (as amended Jan. 29, 2002).
37. H.B. 1802, Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. § 512, at 100 (Pa. 2001) (as amended Feb. 12, 2002),
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/BI/BT/2001/0/HB1802P3320.htm.
38. H.B. 1802 § 828-A, at 105 (as amended Jan. 29, 2002).
39. H.B. 1802 § 512, at 101-02 (as amended Feb. 12, 2002).
previous, broad common law standard.30  Accordingly, Section 512 is intended
to narrow the field of qualified experts, with the result of limiting the
admissibility of expert testimony in medical malpractice actions.31
D.  Legislative History
The legislative history of Section 512 is generally unrevealing.  The
legislation later enacted as MCARE was conceived as House Bill 1802 on
June 19, 2001.32  At the time of the introduction of the bill, no reference to
medical expert qualifications existed.33  A later draft, amended January 29,
2002, included Section 828-A which addressed medical expert
qualifications.34  Although the language of the enacted statute essentially
tracks this draft version, two minor variations are materially significant.35
Under the draft version of now codified subsection (b), the legislature required
an expert to be “engaged in active clinical practice or teaching.”36  The
February 12, 2002 amended version modified this requirement to permit an
expert to “be engaged in or retired within the previous five years from active
clinical practice or teaching” to testify.37  The January 29, 2002 draft version
also permitted the trial court to waive the statutory requirements now codified
in subsection (c) if the trial court found that the expert possessed sufficient
“experience or knowledge . . . as a result of active involvement in the practice
or full-time teaching of medicine within the five-year period before the
incident giving rise to the claim.”38  The February 12, 2002 amended version
stripped the language “before the incident giving rise to the claim” from the
legislation.39  The legislature ultimately adopted the February 12, 2002 version
2006] DOUBLE CHECKING THE DOCTOR’S CREDENTIALS 667
40. See 2002 Pa. Laws 13, §§ 512, 5108.
41. See Weiner v. Fisher, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 (Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl. 2004); McGlaughlin v.
Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-5-675 (Adams County Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 5, 2003); see also Spotts v. Small, 61
Pa. D. & C.4th 225 (Lancaster County Ct. Com. Pl. 2003).  Another currently litigated issue is the
constitutionality of Section 512.  McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., 63 Pa. D. & C.4th 504, 507 (Adams
County Ct. Com. Pl. 2003).  The constitutional challenges take two forms:  claims that Section 512 violates
equal protection and substantive due process and claims that Section 512 improperly infringes upon the
exclusive rule-making authority vested in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court under Art. I, thus violating the
separation of powers.  Id.  Pennsylvania trial courts have unanimously rejected equal protection claims.
Id. at 507-08; Weiner, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th at 25-33.  Recognizing the strong presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation, Pennsylvania trial courts have concluded that when applying a rational basis
test, the distinction in treatment between medical experts and other experts established by Section 512 is
permissible because the state has a legitimate interest in reducing the costs of medical malpractice
insurance.  Weiner, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th at 31-33.  Pennsylvania trial courts have likewise unanimously
rejected claims alleging usurpation by the legislature of supreme court rule-making authority, instead
casting witness competency statutes as evidentiary rather than procedural rules.  Id. at 21-25; McGlaughlin,
63 Pa. D. & C.4th at 507-12.  This holding is consistent with sister state statutes which characterize their
medical expert competency statutes as rules of evidence.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 702 (2003)
(expert competency statute codified in rule of evidence); McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ohio
1981) (recognizing that the expert competency statute was incorporated into the Ohio Rules of Evidence).
Based on the lack of disagreement among trial courts, and the relative weakness of the constitutional claims
against Section 512, it is unlikely an appellate court will find Section 512 unconstitutional.
42. Compare Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th 225 (holding timing of qualification requirement is at
breach) with McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675 (holding timing of qualification requirement is at testimony).
43. See McGlaughlin, 63 Pa. D. & C.4th at 512-13 (granting an interlocutory appeal to the Superior
Court for resolution of the timing issue).
44. Callari v. Rosenwasser, 63 Pa. D. & C.4th 366, 372-73 (Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl. 2003);
Estate of Kusinko v. Cherry, No. 2000-2281, slip op. at 8 (Centre County Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 31, 2003).
of the expert qualification statute on March 20, 2002, to take effect sixty days
later.40
III.  CURRENTLY LITIGATED ISSUES
A.  Timing of Qualification Requirement
One issue critical to interpreting Section 512 is resolving the timing of its
application, namely whether a medical expert must possess the requisite
qualifications at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim or at the time
of testimony during the trial.41  Pennsylvania trial courts have split on the
timing of the application of subsection (b)(2),42 and the Superior Court has yet
to provide guidance, although the question of timing is currently on appeal.43
Initially, challenges to the timing of the application of Section 512 were
directed to the entire MCARE act.44  These early arguments focused on the
applicability of MCARE to causes of action arising prior to its enactment.  At
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45. Callari, 63 Pa. D. & C.4th at 375; Estate of Kusinko, No. 2000-2281, at 8-10.
46. See, e.g., Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 233-40.
47. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.512(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005).
48. See Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 230 (noting that the expert had retired from practice but
maintained his current physician license by attending continuing education classes).
49. See § 1303.512(c)(1)-(c)(3).
50. Id. § 1303.512(e).
least two trial courts considered these arguments, and both held that because
MCARE applied to the testimony of the expert, which occurred at a time
following the enactment of MCARE, MCARE generally, and Section 512
specifically, applied to cases whose cause of action arose prior to the
enactment of MCARE.45  Thus, at this primitive stage of first impression of
Section 512, it appears that trial courts understood Section 512 to apply at the
time of testimony or, at the earliest, the time of the expert’s report, rather than
the time of breach.  As litigants refined their arguments regarding the timing
of Section 512, the focus shifted from the applicability of Section 512, and
MCARE as a whole, to whether the qualification requirements of Section 512
applied at the time of testimony or breach.
While the issue of the timing of the application of Section 512 extends to
nearly all of its subsections, current litigation is focused on subsection
(b)(2),46 which requires that an expert “be engaged in or retired within the
previous five years from active clinical practice or teaching.”47  Depending on
the answer, the relevant timeframe from which to measure the “active” or
“teaching” requirement is five years from the date of testimony or five years
from the date of breach.  Regarding the timing of other subsections of Section
512, subsection (b)(1) has yet to be litigated because medical professionals
often remain licensed long after they retire from active service,48 and thus
subsection (b)(2) tends to be the limiting provision of that subsection.
Subsection (c)(1) mandates measuring from the date of breach; however, the
subspecialty requirement in (c)(2) and the board certification requirement in
(c)(3) contain no such instruction.49  The subsection (e) requirement
concerning active practice or teaching likewise lacks a provision addressing
timing.50
1.  Timing of Section 512(b)(2)
In concluding that the relevant timing for the application of subsection
(b)(2) is the incident giving rise to the claim, the first reported Pennsylvania
trial court to directly respond to this issue determined that the principles of
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51. Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 235-37.
52. Id. at 236.
53. Id.  Adding words and phrases to aid in the interpretation of a statute is permissible when the
words and phrases do not conflict with the obvious purpose or intent of the statute and do not affect the
scope and operation of the statute.  1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1923(c) (West 1995).
54. Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 238-39.
55. Id. at 236.
56. McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-S-675, slip op. at 16 (Adams County Ct. Com. Pl.
Sept. 5, 2003); Weiner v. Fisher, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 11 (Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl. 2004).
57. McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 8-13; Weiner, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th at 11-15.
58. McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 14.
59. Id. at 14-15; Weiner, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th at 14-15.
60. Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); see also Bethea v. Phila. AFL-CIO
Hosp. Ass’n, 871 A.2d 223, 226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
statutory interpretation supported this result.51  The trial court noted a lack of
a clear legislative intent regarding the timing of the application of Section
512.52  The trial court reasoned that although subsection (c)(1) specifically
utilized “as of the time of the alleged breach” language, its omission from
other relevant sections of the statute did not prohibit the trial court from
construing such a timing requirement as consistent with the statute.53  In
support of this construction, the trial court referenced several sister state
statutes which explicitly set forth that the qualifications of a medical expert
should be determined at the time of breach.  The court rejected drawing any
inferences from the statutory language written in the present tense, such as
“expert testifying.”54  Upon these findings, the trial court stepped outside the
statutory language and elaborated that a sound policy required the application
of Section 512 at the time of the alleged breach.55
In direct contrast to the analysis above, two Pennsylvania trial courts have
held that determining a medical expert’s qualifications under subsection (b)(2)
should occur at the time of testimony.56  These courts have premised their
opinions on the statutory language and legislative history of MCARE and
Section 512.57  In support of this construction, one trial court paralleled the
rules addressing general witness competency to subsection (b)(2), which it
deemed to address expert competency, to conclude that witness competency
in general is determined at the time of trial.58  Both trial courts presented
several policy considerations that favored applying subsection (b)(2) at the
time of testimony.59
Recently, the Pennsylvania Superior Court sided with the reasoning of the
latter trial courts, holding that Section 512 required that a medical expert’s
qualifications be measured from the time of the expert’s testimony rather than
the time of the alleged breach.60  In its initial opinion addressing the proper
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61. Bethea, 871 A.2d at 226.
62. Weiner, 871 A.2d at 1286-88.
63. Id. at 1286-87.
64. Id. at 1287.
65. Id. at 1288 n.4.
66. Id. at 1286.
67. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.512(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005).
68. Weiner, 871 A.2d at 1286.
69. Spotts v. Small, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 225, 238-39 (Lancaster County Ct. Com. Pl. 2003).
70. See McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-S-675, slip op. at 13 (Adams County Ct. Com.
Pl. Sept. 5, 2003).
71. Weiner, 871 A.2d at 1286-87.
72. Id.
time for measuring Section 512 requirements, the court held, without any
analysis, that Section 512 required a medical expert to qualify at the time of
testimony.61  Several weeks later, the court fully articulated its reasoning
regarding the Section 512 timing issue in an unrelated opinion.62  The court
concluded that the plain language of Section 512 indicated an unambiguous
legislative intent to apply the Section 512 requirements at the time of the
expert’s testimony.63  The court commented that such an interpretation
comported with sound medical policy,64 although the court acknowledged that
application of this interpretation in certain circumstances might work an
unfair, and likely unanticipated, result.65
i.  Statutory Language
The plain language of the statute provides insight into the timing issue.
As noted above, subsection (b)(2) is written in the present tense.66  Subsection
(b)(2) requires that an expert witness “testifying on a medical matter . . . [b]e
engaged in or retired within the previous five years from active clinical
practice.”67  There is no statutory language in the past tense demonstrating that
the statute contemplates measuring an expert’s qualifications in the past.68
Although one trial court rejected this observation of grammar as simply
describing the reliability rather than the timing of the requirements,69 other
trial courts have not dismissed the language so casually.70  In addition, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that, upon its examination of the plain
language of subsection (b)(2), it appeared unambiguous that subsection (b)(2)
applies only in the present tense.71  The legislature’s use of the present tense
in subsection (b)(2) is indicative of its intent that an expert must satisfy
Section 512 at the moment the expert testifies.72  To conclude otherwise would
require a court to look past the plain language in violation of the rules of
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73. Id.
74. See Kurlansky v. Blythe, 2004-Ohio-766, at 19 (Ohio. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2004) (collecting lower
court cases).  But see Crosswhite v. Desai, 580 N.E.2d 1119, 1124-25 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1989) (cautioning
that a strict grammarian response to an expert competency statute might subvert its purpose).
75. See supra notes 25-26.
76. McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-S-675, slip op. at 12 (Adams County Ct. Com. Pl.
Sept. 5, 2003).
77. Id. at 12-13; Weiner v. Fisher, 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 1, 18-19 (Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl. 2004).
78. Weiner v. Fisher, 871 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
79. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.512(b)(2) (West Supp. 2005).
80. McGlaughlin, No. 99-S-675, at 12.
statutory interpretation.73  Other jurisdictions, citing common usage and plain
language rules of construction, have reached a similar conclusion, reasoning
that use of the present tense in medical expert qualification statutes implicated
the time of testimony as the relevant timeframe for satisfying the statute.74
ii.  Legislative History
The legislative history of MCARE and Section 512 is not entirely unclear
regarding the subject of timing.  Most telling is the legislature’s removal of the
language “before the incident giving rise to the claim” from subsection (e).75
This amendment demonstrated a rejection on the part of the legislature to
define the timing of the requirements of subsection (e) according to the date
of the incident.76  However, the legislature did not completely eliminate the
“incident giving rise to the breach” language, as it left intact subsection (c)(1).
Inasmuch as the legislature imposed the “breach” language in subsection
(c)(1), but declined to use or withdrew the “breach” language elsewhere, this
construction evinces a legislative intent not to focus the application of (b)(2)
at the time of breach.77  The Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the
presence of the “breach” language in subsection (c)(1) and the conspicuous
absence of the “breach” language from subsection (b)(2) evinced a legislative
intent to focus subsection (b)(2) at the time of the expert’s testimony.78
The only other amendment made to the original draft of Section 512
substantiates this conclusion.  The second change initiated by the legislature
involved modifying the language in subsection (b)(2) to “being engaged in or
retired within the previous five years from active clinical practice.”79  The
resulting language in subsection (b)(2) mirrored in effect the requirements set
forth in subsection (e), the very subsection where the legislature removed the
reference to timing at the “date of the incident giving rise to the claim.”80  A
consistent reading of the similarly worded requirements in subsections (b)(2)
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84. Id.
85. Id. at 239.
86. Grondin v. Curi, 817 A.2d 61, 74 (Conn. 2003).
87. Since the requirements of Section 512 apply to all experts regardless of whether the expert is
testifying for the plaintiff or the defendant, a defendant physician that provides medical opinions at trial
may be precluded if the expert retired from active medical care more than five years prior to testimony or
otherwise fails to satisfy the Section 512 standard.  Spotts, 61 Pa. D. & C.4th at 237-38.
and (e) requires the same timing of application.81  Since the legislature
rejected the time of breach for subsection (e), it would likewise do so for
subsection (b)(2).82  If the legislature intended otherwise, it would have simply
inserted the “timing” language when it modified subsection (b)(2).  For a court
to prescribe such a requirement now under the guise of its powers of statutory
construction would therefore be improper under Pennsylvania law.
iii.  Policy Rationale
The policy rationale cited by the trial court that held that the time of
breach is the relevant time to apply Section 512 makes the common sense
observation that the timing of the statute’s application at the breach would
ensure that the expert testifying is familiar with the standard of care required
at that period in time as required under subsection (c)(1).83  A substantial
amount of time often elapses between the breach of care and trial, which
increases the risk that a medical expert satisfying subsection (b)(2)
qualifications at trial has little experience or familiarity with the standard of
care at the time of the breach.84  The time of a trial is notoriously difficult to
predict.  Thus, relying on an unascertained date with no relation to the time of
breach to test the competency of medical experts seems insensible.85
Hypothetical situations further illustrate the consequences of determining
an expert’s qualifications at testimony.  A circumstance might arise where
lengthy litigation would permit a medical expert who qualifies at trial to have
been only enrolled in high school at the time of the breach.86  In addition,
construing subsection (b)(2) to apply at trial might have the unusual
consequence of precluding the defendant doctor from offering expert
testimony on his own behalf.87  Furthermore, unavoidable delays in scheduling
trials may have the unusual result of an expert, qualified at the time of
disposition, becoming disqualified before trial due to the expiration of the
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97. Weiner, 871 A.2d at 1287-88.
98. McGlaughlin v. Gettysburg Hosp., No. 99-S-675, slip op. at 14-15 (Adams County Ct. Com.
Pl. Sept. 5, 2003).
five-year limit under subsection (b)(2).88  Such an interpretation might
encourage delay tactics to prevent a plaintiff’s retired expert from testifying
at trial.89  The legislature could not have intended these results, and
interpreting a statute to reach seemingly absurd conclusions does not comport
with Pennsylvania law.90
One rationale offered in response is that applying Section 512 at trial
permits the introduction of the most recent medical knowledge available for
the fact finder to consider.91  Thus, on issues such as risk, causation, or the
nature of the alleged injury, the fact finder is afforded the most current
medical information.92  Furthermore, determining an expert’s qualifications
at trial permits a jury to assess the credibility of the expert at the time the
expert testifies.93  Determining the credibility of an expert in the present when
his qualifications were measured sometime in the distant past would present
an imposing challenge for a jury.94  This argument, however, is slightly
undermined by subsection (c)(1), which requires the expert to possess
familiarity with the standard of care as of the time of breach rather than the
time of testimony.95  Thus, new information not known at the time of breach
is irrelevant to an expert attempting to establish a breach of the standard of
care at trial.96  Nevertheless, with regard to other issues, access to current
medical knowledge will permit the fact finder to assess more accurately the
circumstances in question.97  In addition, applying subsection (b)(2) at the
time of trial ensures that testifying medical experts are currently qualified,
which furthers the legislature’s goal of prescribing a more stringent standard
to medical experts.98
Finally, a hypothetical helps illustrate the shortcomings of the statute’s
application at the time of breach.  One circumstance posed by a trial court
involves a young child who suffers an act of negligence but waits to sue until
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101. Compare Grondin v. Curi, 817 A.2d 61, 71-73 (Conn. 2003) (explaining a statute merely
codifying the common law standard but not altering the scope of which experts may testify), and Endorf
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102. Compare ALA. CODE § 6-5-548 (2004), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-184c (West 2004),
and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 702 (2003), and OHIO . REV. CODE ANN. EVID . R. 601(D) (West 2000),
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104. See Grondin, 817 A.2d at 73-74 (collecting sister court cases that held that, in the absence of
specific language to the contrary, qualifications are not measured at time of breach).
105. See Chapman v. Smith, 893 So. 2d 293, 297-98 (Ala. 2004); Grondin, 817 A.2d at 74.
reaching majority.99  A derivative of this hypothetical involves a patient who
fails to discover an act of negligence, such as a sponge left in a body cavity,
for many years.  Locating an expert in active practice at the time of or the five
years prior to the breach may be impossible in these situations.100  Thus,
construing subsection (b)(2) to apply at breach can lead to absurd results not
sanctioned by the legislature.
iv.  Sister State Statutes
Any comparison between Section 512 and similar sister statutes is
complicated by differences in purpose101 and statutory language.102  In defense
of requiring an expert to meet the subsection (b)(2) standard at the time of
breach, one trial court noted that several similar statutes explicitly mandated
the applicable timeframe as the time of breach.103  However, the
persuasiveness of this argument is diminished by the observation that these
sister statutes, passed prior to Section 512, were available and likely examined
by the legislature, which subsequently declined to add such language within
subsection (b)(2).  Furthermore, when addressing qualification statutes that
fail to provide a timing, state courts have consistently not required an expert
to satisfy the requisite qualifications at the time of breach.104  Thus, little
authority exists to suggest reading in a time of breach requirement to
subsection (b)(2) when language to that effect is absent.
Interestingly, several state courts have construed requirements within
their qualification statutes that have no specific direction as to their timing to
lack entirely any time restrictions.105  Doctrinally, sister state courts have
reasoned that their respective legislatures, by specifying the relevant timing
for some requirements of the statute, have evinced an intent to not prescribe
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time restrictions where an express time requirement is omitted.106  However,
sister courts have utilized this construction only in the context of board
certification requirements.107  Equating the legislature’s act of omitting a
timing requirement from many of the subsections of Section 512 with an
intent to establish no time restrictions makes little sense when considered
within the larger scheme of the statute.  For example, in accord with this
rationale, the lack of a timing requirement in subsections (b), (c)(2), (c)(3),
and (e) would indicate a legislative intent not to establish a timeframe for
these requirements.  Thus, it is conceivable that an expert who satisfies each
of these various qualifications at some point during his life, except those under
subsection (c)(3), is qualified to testify.  Furthermore, construing the statute
in this manner would provide no guidance for measuring the five-year
requirement in subsections (b)(2) and (e).  In fact, it would render the five-
year requirement meaningless.  This result is absurd and therefore
unpersuasive.  It is thus not surprising that no court or litigant in Pennsylvania
has even argued such a construction.
2.  Impact of Subsection (B)(2) Timing upon Section 512 Timing
In the interest of construing Section 512 as internally consistent, it is
likely that a decision regarding the timing of subsection (b)(2) will impact the
timing of the application of all subsections of Section 512.  The alternative
constructions illustrate the necessity of this conclusion.  Construing the
application of subsection (b)(2) at a different time than subsection (e), which
shares a similar five-year active practitioner requirement, is illogical.  In
addition, the tense of the statutory text throughout Section 512 is consistent,108
implying a similar timing of application.  Furthermore, to calculate subsection
(b)(2) at breach while applying subsections (b)(1) or (c) at a time other than
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111. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a)-(b) (West 1995).
112. See id. § 1922(1).
113. Dranzo v. Winterhalter, 577 A.2d 1349, 1355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
breach defeats the policy considerations that support the time of injury as the
relevant time for determining an expert’s qualifications.109  The relatedness of
the policy concerns strengthens the argument that the timing debate over
subsection (b)(2) will be determinative for the timing of other subsections.
3.  Conclusion
The above analysis illustrates the tension between measuring a medical
expert’s qualifications at the time of breach and the time of testimony.  The
difficulty of determining the proper time of application is evident in the
conflicting holdings of Pennsylvania trial courts.  As illustrated by the
opposing policy rationales, both approaches are imperfect and could lead to
undesired or unintended results, thus exposing the inherent weaknesses in
premising the construction of Section 512 solely upon policy concerns.110
Owing to the susceptibility of policy arguments to manipulation and widely
varying interpretation, Pennsylvania law instructs a trial court to consider
policy concerns second to the plain language of the statute.111  If the language
is clear and unambiguous, the Act restricts a court from inquiring further
unless the resulting construction is irrational or absurd.112  This rule is rooted
in the notion that legislatures are better suited for making policy judgments
than courts.  Occasionally, the application of a statute to a particular
individual may present consequences not intended by the legislature.
However, as the Superior Court aptly noted, the correct forum for resolving
such policy concerns is the legislature.113
Applying these principles to subsection (b)(2), the above analysis
regarding the plain language of the statute makes clear that the requirements
of Section 512(b)(2) should be measured at the time of the expert’s testimony.
Pennsylvania law instructs that, upon this determination, the inquiry into the
statutory issue is concluded.  However, even considering the additional
sources from which courts may typically seek guidance regarding legislative
intent, a similar conclusion is reached.  Legislative history, for example,
demonstrates an apparent intent of the legislature not to focus Section 512
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120. Id. § 1303.512(c).
requirements at the time of breach, with the exception of subsection (c)(1).
In addition, although the application of the statute in some remote
circumstances may cause an illogical or absurd conclusion, neither
interpretation of the statute completely avoids illogical results.  On the basis
of these observations, the better reasoned approach to the interpretation of
subsection (b)(2) and other subsections is determining a medical expert’s
qualifications at the time of testimony.
B.  Applicability to Non-Physician Defendants
Any medical entity licensed by the Department of Health generally falls
within the ambit of MCARE regulation.114  However, the text of subsections
512(a) and (c) makes clear that all medical experts rendering an opinion in
medical malpractice actions against physicians must meet the minimum
qualification criteria.115  The statute is silent as to whether malpractice actions
involving hospitals, medical partnerships, nurses or non-physician defendants
are subject to Section 512 scrutiny.  It is unlikely that any definition of
physician is broad enough to encompass hospitals or nurses, so the physician
requirement may limit the applicability of Section 512.116  At present, at least
one plaintiff has raised an argument that Section 512 applies solely to
physicians and not to hospitals.117  In that case, the trial court made no explicit
finding on that issue, and the Superior Court declined to address it, instead
remanding the case to trial against the hospital on alternative grounds.118
Specifically under Section 512, the application of subsection (a) is
premised upon an expert testifying in “a medical . . . action against a
physician.”119  Likewise, subsection (c) specifies that experts testifying to a
“physician’s standard of care” must satisfy the additional qualification
requirements set forth in subsection (c).120  In contrast, subsection (b) more
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broadly states “an expert testifying in medical matters” must satisfy
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2).121  It appears odd that the general expert
qualification standard contained in subsection (a) would restrict its operation
solely to physician defendants.  In effect, the minimum qualification
requirements for experts testifying against a defendant hospital would be less
stringent than that of an expert testifying against an individual physician.
Under such a reading, the admissibility of expert testimony regarding
defendant hospitals would remain subject to the previous, more broad
common law standard.
Even more curious is the legislature’s decision to omit the “physician”
requirement in subsection (b).122  It seems somewhat illogical to limit
applicability of the general, common law “baseline” qualification
requirements to experts testifying against physician defendants, but then
demand medical experts satisfy the enhanced standard established in
subsection (b) without regard to the type of defendant.  The physician
requirement for the application of subsection (c) is less troublesome in terms
of logic.123  Both subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) specify that the testifying
medical expert have similar qualifications to the defendant physician.124  Since
a hospital cannot be board certified or practice a substantially similar
subspecialty, limiting subsection (c) to physicians is sensible.
The legislature’s intent behind such a distinction depending on the
defendant and its decision not to extend the codified standard in subsection (a)
beyond physicians is not clear.  The legislature intended MCARE to help
ensure the affordability of malpractice insurance,125 and hospitals, much like
physicians, have experienced increases in their liability insurance in recent
years.126  However, perhaps this distinction is not so significant.  Since
subsection (a) is regarded as simply a restatement of the common law
standard,127 physician and non-physician defendants are likely held to a similar
standard regardless of whether the common law or subsection (a) is applied.
Subsection (b) represented a departure from the common law, and its
enhanced standard applies regardless of the identity of the defendant.128  As
previously stated, subsection (c) primarily insures that a testifying physician
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134. Michigan is one example.  Following the passage of Michigan’s expert competency statute, the
statute’s constitutionality was challenged first in McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148 (Mich. 1999), and
exhibit similar credentials to a defendant physician, and is mostly inapplicable
for other types of defendants.129  The practical result under this analysis is that
the admissibility of evidence at trial under either standard will be similar,
except when subsection (c) is implicated.
Another possible explanation, previously raised on appeal but resulting
in no decision, is the argument that no section of Section 512 is intended to
apply to any medical defendants other than physicians.130  However, the lack
of the physician-defendant restriction on subsection (b) would appear fatal to
this argument, especially when considered in light of the rule of statutory
construction that instructs every word in a statute should be given effect to the
extent possible.131  Although a clear explanation for this distinction between
physician and other defendants is unavailing, the result of the distinction is not
absurd or unreasonable, so the clear, plain language of the statute should
control.132  Accordingly, the physician requirement should limit the
applicability of subsections (a) and (c) solely to experts testifying against
physician-defendants.
IV.  UNRESOLVED STATUTORY TERMS
The case law of sister state statutes addressing the qualification of
medical experts reveals that certain phrases and terms common to these
statutes are frequently and repeatedly litigated.133  Since litigation in
Pennsylvania regarding Section 512 essentially parallels that observed in
states with previously enacted expert qualification statutes, it is likely
arguments raised out of state will be repeated in Pennsylvania.134  Thus, once
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139. Estate of Kusinko v. Cherry, No. 2000-2281, slip op. at 13 (Centre County Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 31,
2003); Johnson v. Rybarcqyk, No. 98-06728, slip op. at 5-6 (Montgomery County Ct. Com. Pl. May 31,
current litigation focusing primarily on broad issues regarding the
applicability of Section 512 is resolved, it is foreseeable that litigation in
Pennsylvania will shift to focus upon the interpretation of key terms and
phrases within the statutory text of Section 512.  These key terms of interest
include “board certification,” “active clinical practitioner,” “full-time,”
“teaching,” and “same subspecialty.”
A.  Board Certification
Other states’ case law has addressed several issues relating to the
interpretation of the board certification requirement that may impact
Pennsylvania litigation.  Initially, it should be noted that specific text utilized
in subsection (c)(3) that provides for the “same or similar” board certification
likely avoids the issue resulting from a strict construction of the “same” board
certification language.135  For example, one state supreme court held that its
expert qualification statute, which required the same American board
certification in the same specialty, precluded an expert certified by the
American Board of Surgery from testifying against a physician certified by the
American Osteopathic Board of Surgery.136  The court reasoned that, despite
compelling policy arguments that the certification organizations had the same
purpose, certified the same types of physicians, and had the same
requirements, the plain language of the statute dictated the court’s result.137
The “similar to” language in subsection (c)(3) likely affords a trial court some
discretion to avoid this result in cases where the board certifications, although
facially different, are essentially equal in quality.138
In early litigation following the enactment of MCARE, several
Pennsylvania trial courts addressed the situation of an expert that lacked an
identical board certification as the defendant physician.  The trial courts
quickly concluded that the plain language of subsection (c)(3) required
preclusion of the expert’s testimony.139  However, these early decisions did not
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contemplate the more complex problem of relevancy that will likely arise in
future litigation.
1.  Relevancy of Board Certification
One complexity litigated in other states involving the board certification
requirement is the circumstance where the defendant physician possesses
certification by multiple boards in one or more subspecialties.140  The question
that follows is whether the testifying expert must possess board certification
in each of the subspecialties as the defendant physician or just the relevant
subspecialty.141  A related issue arises when a defendant doctor possesses
board certification in a subspecialty, but the treatment at issue is unrelated to
that certification.  The issue thus becomes whether the expert must have any
board certification in such situations.
Although no Pennsylvania case law has addressed this facet of the board
certification requirement, sister jurisdictions having considered the issue have
incorporated a relevancy standard.  For example, one court has held that its
expert competency statute did not require an expert to match exactly every
board certification possessed by the defendant physician.142  The court
reasoned that requiring an expert to possess board certification in an irrelevant
specialty was an absurd result.143  Likewise, another state court stated in dicta
that its board certification requirement should not be construed to require the
expert to match a certification irrelevant to the treatment being litigated.144
The analysis of sister state courts of incorporating a relevancy
requirement despite the lack of explicit language is persuasive.  It seems
illogical and unreasonable to demand that an expert match exactly all the
board certifications possessed by the defendant physician when the treatment
at issue does not implicate the credentials of the defendant physician.
Requiring a plaintiff to find an expert capable of matching board certifications
unrelated to the treatment at issue is a needless burden on the plaintiff and
would hardly ensure MCARE’s stated objective of providing efficient
compensation for injured parties through the legal system.  In addition, an
implicit goal of Section 512 is insuring that experts testify only to matters in
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149. See infra notes 150-52.
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Pl. Sept. 5, 2003).
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which they are qualified.  Requiring a match of irrelevant board certification
in no way furthers this objective.  Therefore, a Pennsylvania court should
construe the board certification requirement in subsection (c)(3) to apply only
when the treatment at issue is related to the board certification possessed by
the defendant physician.
B.  Same Subspecialty
An expert testifying to a standard of care must satisfy subsection (c)(2),
which provides that an expert must practice in the same subspecialty or a
subspecialty with a substantially similar standard of care for the specific care
at issue as the defendant physician.145  Subsection (c)(2) is unique amongst
sister state competency statutes because it requires a higher standard of
subspecialty, rather than just specialty.146  Thus, it would appear from the
plain language that the legislature intended to enact a stricter standard than is
commonly employed in competency statutes.  However, subsection (c)(2)
permits an expert practicing in a subspecialty with a substantially similar
standard of care to testify,147 thus providing the trial judge some discretion in
enforcing this requirement.  Since the terms specialty and subspecialty are
well defined in the medical field, litigation of this subsection will likely focus
upon the permissible degree of similarity.  Reported state case law is relatively
unhelpful, as most litigation focuses upon attempts to construe the same
specialty requirement in their respective qualification statutes to the higher
standard of subspecialty,148 an irrelevant argument in Pennsylvania.
Several Pennsylvania trial courts have considered what categories of
subspecialties might share a substantially similar standard of care so as to
meet subsection (c)(2).149  Trial courts have found this requirement unsatisfied
by a neurologist testifying to the standard of care applicable to an emergency
room physician, a family practitioner and a radiologist;150 a pulmonology
expert testifying to the standard of care applicable to a neurologist;151 and a
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160. See, e.g., Estate of Kusinko v. Cherry, No. 2000-2281, slip op. at 14 (Centre County Ct. Com.
Pl. Dec. 31, 2003) (finding that, although the expert and the defendant physician practiced the same
podiatry expert testifying to the standard of care applicable to a practitioner
of physical medicine.152  In the only reported case at the Superior Court
addressing the degree of similarity necessary to satisfy the subspecialty
requirement of subsection (c)(2), a trial court elected to admit the testimony
of an expert who failed to meet the same subspecialty standard.153  Parsing the
Superior Court opinion affirming the trial court’s discretion under subsection
(c)(2), it is evident that the trial court applied a rather stringent test of
similarity.  In the case, the defendant physician possessed certification in
nephrology, as well as specialized training in internal medicine, and the expert
possessed certification in internal medicine and critical care.154  The
malpractice suit did not involve the defendant’s care regarding nephrology,
but rather concerned claims related to the defendant’s alleged lack of care for
failing to identify an airway obstruction.155  The treatment for such a condition
implicated the defendant’s knowledge of internal medicine.156  The expert
testified only to the standard of care applicable to a physician with specialized
training in internal medicine.157  Although the defendant and the expert
practiced different subspecialties, they both possessed specialized knowledge
of internal medicine, the specific care at issue.158  In effect, the trial court
permitted testimony under the similar subspecialty exception when the
standard of care of the subspecialty of the expert was essentially identical to
the standard of care applicable to the treatment at issue provided by the
defendant.  Whether such a high degree of similarity would always be
necessary is not yet clear.
Considering the legislature’s decision to prescribe the high standard of
subspecialty in conjunction with the Superior Court’s recognition that Section
512 plainly prefers that a testifying expert satisfy the same-subspecialty
requirement,159 a strict construction of this requirement should be enforced in
Pennsylvania.  Furthermore, trial courts have generally endorsed such a
construction.160
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161. See Kurlansky v. Blythe, 2004-Ohio-766 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2004); see also Endorf v.
Bohlender, 995 P.2d 896 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (hearing similar litigation on the phrase “actual clinical
practice”); Edwards v. Wall, 542 S.E.2d 258 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
162. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 702 (2003), and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412 (West
2005), with 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.512 (West Supp. 2005).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, R. 702; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3412.
164. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. EVID . R. 601(D) (West 2000).
165. Many sister state statutes employ the phrase “clinical practice” instead of clinical practitioner.
However, the operative effect of the two phrases is identical.
166. Compare Endorf, 995 P.2d 896, with McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 159-60 (Ohio 1981).
167. Edwards v. Wall, 542 S.E.2d 258, 263 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting an attorney’s dictionary
of medicine cited in another case); see also STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 362 (27th ed. 2000)
C.  Active Clinical Practitioner
The key phrase “active clinical practitioner” has generated significant
litigation in sister states.161  Although the precise language in each state statute
varies, the words “active” or “actual” and “clinical” are common amongst all
the statutes of interest.162
1.  “Active”
Examining first the “active” requirement, many state statutes define
“active” or “actual” as a majority of professional time or fifty percent of
professional time.163  State statutes lacking an express definition of these terms
have also reasoned that a similar percentage of activity is necessary to satisfy
the requirement.164  Since Section 512 likewise lacks any explicit direction as
to the meaning of “active,” the trial court may, in its discretion, determine
what level of activity is sufficient to satisfy the “active” requirement.  Such
a finding should require at least a majority of time dedicated to activity as a
clinical practitioner.
2.  “Clinical Practitioner”
The “clinical practitioner” requirement165 has generated relatively diverse
holdings regarding the scope of its definition.166  Beginning with the plain text
of the phrase, medical dictionaries ascribe a narrow meaning to “clinical” to
include “based on or pertaining to actual experience in the observation and
treatment of patients.”167  General dictionaries define “clinical” more broadly
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disease”).
168. See In re Barnes, 510 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 423 (1971)).
169. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 914 (10th ed. 1994) [hereinafter MERRIAM
WEBSTER’S].
170. Endorf v. Bohlender, 995 P.2d 896, 901-03 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000).
171. Id. at 901-02.
172. McCrory v. State, 423 N.E.2d 156, 160 (Ohio 1981).
173. Id. at 160-61.
174. See Amato v. Ctr. Med. & Surgical Assocs., No. 2002-357, 2004 WL 1987427 (Centre County
Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 10, 2004).
175. Id. at *1.
176. Id. at *1-2.
to encompass activity beyond patient treatment, including “applying objective
or standardized methods . . . to the description, evaluation and modification
of human behavior.”168  The plain text meaning of practitioner presents no
conflict, as medical authority borrows the commonly understood definition of
“one who practices a profession.”169  This definition is functionally similar to
that of “practice,” commonly used in place of the word practitioner within
sister state competency statutes.
State courts conflict on which definition of “clinical” to endorse.  One
state court, in rejecting a proffered definition of “clinical” to include any
medically related activity such as research, mentoring, consultation, and
administrative activity, concluded that the medical definition of “clinical”
should control.170  The court reasoned that the legislature intended the phrase
“clinical practice,” when used in a medically related statute, to reflect the
commonly understood medical definition of “clinical practice.”  Thus, the
court found actual clinical practice to pertain solely to actual patient care.171
Other state courts define the phrase “active clinical practice” more broadly to
include any physician-specialist whose work was “so related or adjunctive to
patient care.”172  This court determined that a physician who spent the
majority of his time as the Director of Clinical Research for a drug
manufacturer satisfied this requirement.173
One trial court in Pennsylvania has addressed the active clinical
practitioner requirement.174  The trial court noted that the expert admitted that
he had not treated his own patients or performed a surgery in the fifteen years
preceding his testimony.175  The trial court examined the expert’s current
activities, which included conducting limited examinations of patients,
although no official recording in the patient log occurred.176  The trial court
found the expert’s informal, unofficial visits to patients failed to satisfy the
686 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:661
177. Id. at *5.
178. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.512(b)(2), (e) (West Supp. 2005).
179. See id.
180. This test is merely a convenient method of organizing the analysis under this requirement
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181. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S, supra note 169, at 1209.
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active clinical requirement.177  Although the trial court declined to specify
what definition of “clinical” it endorsed and what level of activity would
satisfy the active standard, underlying the trial court’s reasoning is an apparent
concern with the expert’s long absence from actual patient care, thus implying
the court’s adoption of the narrower interpretation of “clinical.”  This
reasoning is persuasive.  Within the context of Section 512 and MCARE
generally, which is primarily concerned with medical professionals, it seems
reasonable to assume the legislature understood the common medical meaning
ascribed to the term “clinical” and intended this meaning to prevail.
Therefore, the medically sanctioned definition of “clinical” controls within
Pennsylvania.
D.  Teaching
The requirement of “teaching” is specified under both subsections (b)(2)
and (e).178  It appears from the plain language of Section 512 that the
legislature intended the teaching provision to permit the admission of
testimony from medical professors and others not directly involved in patient
care.179  The inquiry under the teaching requirement is best analyzed under a
two-prong test.180  The first prong relates to the quality or nature of activities
that satisfactorily fit within the requirement.  The second prong involves
determining the length of time an expert must spend in teaching-related
activities to satisfy the standard.  The statute provides no definition of
“teaching,” and little guidance for answering this inquiry.  The common
dictionary provides some insight, as it defines “teaching” as the “act, practice,
or profession of a teacher.”181  A teacher is further defined as “one who
instructs, especially one whose occupation is to instruct.”182  At least when
regarding the timing prong of the teaching inquiry, it appears that an expert
should spend at least a substantial time in teaching activities for an expert to
be considered engaged in an “occupation of instruction.”  However, this
definition provides little guidance in resolving what activities are appropriate
under the nature of the activities prong in the context of medical teaching, an
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184. Edwards v. Wall, 542 S.E.2d 258, 261-62 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001).
185. Id. at 264.
186. See Hunt v. Crossroads Psychiatric & Psychological Ctr., No. 79120, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS
5388 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2001).  Although some state statutes lack a provision for permitting experts
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189. See Amato v. Ctr. Med. & Surgical Assocs., No. 2002-357, 2004 WL 1987427 (Centre County
Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 10, 2004).
inquiry further complicated by the divergence of instruction in medical school
from traditional models of teaching.183
Little case law exists delineating precisely what type of activities qualify
a medical expert under the “teaching” standard, and no sister state case law is
directly on point.  One state court engaged in a discussion of what type of
teaching activities would satisfy its competency statute, which required an
expert engage in the “instruction of students.”184  In considering what
constituted instruction of students, the court reasoned that formal lectures and
the treatment of patients in the presence of residents, fellows and students met
the instruction requirement.185  Addressing what types of activities fail under
this standard, state courts have rejected the testimony of experts whose roles
were primarily consulting or administrative, reasoning these activities
diverged too far from actual medical practice.186  Regarding the timing prong,
most state competency statutes establish specifically what amount of activity
will satisfy their respective standard, generally requiring an expert to dedicate
fifty percent or a majority of professional time in medical activities such as
teaching.187  This amount of time corresponds with that imposed on the active
requirement discussed above.188  Section 512 lacks specific language
addressing timing, thus vesting this determination within the discretion of the
trial court.
One Pennsylvania trial court has addressed the teaching standard under
subsections (b)(2) and (e).189  Under the nature of the activities prong of the
test posited above, the trial court made several findings of fact.  The expert
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ceased actively treating patients fifteen years prior to his testimony.190  The
expert no longer formally lectured or published papers.191  Additionally, the
expert’s role at the medical school did not resemble that of a typical professor,
as the expert conducted no evaluations or grading, lacked scheduled hours for
instruction or office hours, and adhered to no established daily routine or
schedule.192  In addition, although the expert met with students in committee
meetings to discuss treatment options for patients, the expert bore neither
direct responsibility nor oversight as to the treatment students then provided
for patients.193  The trial court characterized the expert’s interactions with
students as merely informal mentoring, an activity short of satisfying the
teaching requirement of subsection (b)(2).194
Regarding the amount of time spent in teaching activities, the trial court
deemed that the expert independently failed this prong.195  The expert met
informally with students, residents and fellows twice a week for a few hours
as a member of a committee discussion.196  The court found that this amount
of time fell short of that required under subsection (b)(2).197  Apparent from
the trial court’s opinion is that the teaching standard of subsection (b)(2)
reflects an implicit requirement of active teaching, which the expert failed to
satisfy.198  In addressing the standard for teaching under subsection (e), the
trial court reasoned that this teaching standard was at least equally as stringent
as that under subsection (b)(2), and thus concluded that the expert’s
“mentoring” activities fell short of full-time teaching.199
The reasoning of the Pennsylvania trial court regarding the teaching
requirements of subsections (b)(2) and (e) is persuasive, and its findings
comport with the plain language definition of teaching described above.
Regarding the nature of the activities prong, the trial court expanded its
inquiry beyond the traditional evidence of teaching such as lectures and exams
to examine whether the expert treated patients in the presence of students, or
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assisted residents and fellows with diagnosis and treatment schemes.200  The
trial court correctly concluded that participating informally with no direct
oversight failed to qualify the expert.201  Regarding the timing prong, meetings
held twice a week for several hours could not constitute a majority of the
expert’s professional time, so the trial court correctly found the expert failed
this inquiry as well.202  Thus, under the dual inquiry for the teaching
requirement, the plain language of the teaching standard and case law require
that an expert be employed in the occupation of teaching and dedicate at least
a majority of professional time to teaching-related activities to satisfy
subsections (b)(2) and (e).
Further complicating the teaching requirement is that the teaching
requirement under subsection (e) is qualified by “full-time,” but the teaching
requirement under subsection (b)(2) lacks similar language.203  In the interest
of consistency, the activities prong of the teaching requirement under
subsection (e) will likely be construed identically to that under subsection
(b)(2).  How the added requirement of full-time modifies the timing prong of
the teaching requirement is unclear.  The most likely interpretation is that the
“full-time” requirement will demand at least as stringent a standard for
teaching as that under subsection (b)(2).204  It is possible the “full-time”
qualifier may demand a more involved teaching regime for experts seeking
qualification to testify under a subsection (e) waiver.205  However, because the
plain meaning of teaching implies an occupation of teaching, most experts
qualified to testify under the teaching requirement will be, in effect, engaged
in full-time teaching activities.
V.  TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
Traditionally, Pennsylvania law vested significant discretion in the trial
judge to determine the competency of witnesses and the admissibility of
testimony.206  Section 512 preserves this discretionary role, albeit with some
690 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:661
207. See § 1303.512(b), (e).
208. Id. § 1303.512(b).
209. Wexler v. Hecht, 847 A.2d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (regarding subsection (a), the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has opined that it simply restates the “baseline” common law requirements
for admissibility of an medical expert’s testimony, and thus may not be waived).
210. See § 1303.512(b) (asserting that “the court may waive the requirements of this subsection for
an expert on a matter other than the standard of care”) (emphasis added).
211. See id. § 1303.512(e).
212. Id. § 1303.512(d), (e).
213. See id. § 1303.512(d).
214. See id.
215. Id. § 1303.512(e).
216. See id. § 1303.512(e).
217. Id. § 1303.512(b)(2).
important limitations and considerations.207  The first provision addressing the
discretion immediately follows subsection (b) and permits a trial court to
waive the requirements of “this subsection” for an expert otherwise competent
to testify on all matters except the standard of care applicable to the defendant
physician.208  Although the waiver provision does not clearly state to which
subsection it applies, the Superior Court has already determined that
subsection (a) cannot be waived.209  This discretionary bypass is limited as the
trial court possesses no discretionary waiver of subsection (b) when the expert
is testifying to a standard of care.210  Thus, every expert testifying to a
standard of care must always satisfy subsection (b).211
Subsections (d) and (e) provide a waiver for the trial judge regarding the
requirements set forth in subsection (c) for an expert testifying to a standard
of care.212  Subsection (d) provides a waiver addressing the situation of the
“wandering physician,” which results when a physician’s treatment falls
outside the scope of his specialty.213  This subsection permits the testimony of
an expert experienced in the standard of care of the relevant treatment at issue
regardless of whether the defendant physician possessed similar
qualifications.214  Thus, a physician treating outside the scope of his
experience is subject to the standard of care of a physician trained in that
specialty.  Accordingly, this waiver provision prevents Section 512 from
precluding an expert who might have the most relevant knowledge and
experience from testifying.
Subsection (e) provides a waiver of the same subspecialty and board
certification requirement.215  Although a trial court’s discretion is restricted to
experts who satisfy the requirements established within the waiver
provision,216 the practical effect of these requirements is limited.  Since an
expert testifying to a standard of care must always satisfy subsection (b),217
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any expert considered under this waiver provision must already satisfy
subsection (b)(2), which requires an expert to have active clinical or teaching
experience in the prior five years.218  Subsection (e) specifies a similar
requirement that an expert must have experience resulting from active
involvement in or full-time teaching of medicine.219  Although varying slightly
in text, the requirements likely operate with same practical effect.  Thus, most
experts qualified under subsection (b) will satisfy these requirements for
waiver.  The practical result of this analysis is that a trial court will possess
relatively unlimited discretion to bypass the board certification and same
subspecialty requirements.
The strategic limitation of the trial court’s discretion evinces a legislative
intent to regulate strictly the qualifications of experts testifying to a standard
of care, with less concern for experts testifying to other medical issues.
However, the legislature made clear through MCARE and Section 512 its
intent to apply a more restrictive standard to medical experts testifying in
general.220  As a result, trial courts should be wary of exercising their
discretion when such discretion will permit an expert to subvert the
restrictions of Section 512 generally, and trial courts should exercise extreme
caution when permitting an expert testifying to a standard of care to bypass
the statutory requirements.  Trial courts in Pennsylvania have generally
adhered to a principle of caution regarding discretionary waivers, precluding
experts that fail to satisfy Section 512 requirements except in circumstances
where injustice or unfairness might result.221
VI.  CONCLUSION
The question that remains is whether Section 512, as interpreted above,
will accomplish the legislature’s goal of limiting the admissibility of expert
testimony in medical malpractice actions, and whether the statute will achieve
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its ultimate objective of stabilizing malpractice insurance costs.  Currently, no
empirical data exists to show that medical malpractice rates have remained
affordable or decreased as a result of the implementation of Section 512.
Furthermore, isolating Section 512 to analyze its effectiveness separate from
other changes implemented in conjunction within MCARE is likely
impossible.  However, it is apparent under Section 512 that trial courts are
rejecting expert testimony previously admissible under the more lenient
common law standard, hence the litigation initiated by plaintiffs challenging
the statute’s constitutionality, as well as the motions in limine and summary
judgments in favor of defendant physicians.  This more aggressive scrutiny by
the trial court of the qualifications of medical experts coincides with the
Pennsylvania legislature’s goal of restricting the admissibility of testimony to
those experts most qualified to testify on medical matters.  Although the scale
of rejection by trial courts of unqualified experts is not clear, any rejection is
proof that the legislature’s goal of limiting the admissibility of expert
testimony is currently succeeding.
Although resolution of the general issues of Section 512 by Pennsylvania
courts to date has resulted in an appreciable restriction of medical expert
testimony, much of the statute remains untested.  Future litigation will
scrutinize closely the precise statutory language and, as a result, the continued
success of the statute hinges upon how Pennsylvania courts interpret the key
terms of the statute.  An expansive interpretation of the terms or a liberal use
of discretion to evade the restrictions on expert testimony could undermine the
statute’s current success and diminish the critical qualification aspects of the
statute.  As this note makes clear, adherence to the unambiguous meaning of
these statutory terms, as mandated by Pennsylvania law, will ensure that the
statute will continue to operate to restrict testimony from unqualified experts,
thus satisfying this important intermediate goal of the legislature.  Ultimately,
restricting testimony to only the most qualified experts permits a trial court to
ensure that legitimate and qualified malpractice claims are heard while
frivolous claims are filtered out.  Such equilibrium will permit stabilization in
the medical malpractice arena, the ultimate goal of Section 512.
